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How to draw the line between protected expression and speech that can be
suppressed because it is likely to cause discrimination is . . . a difficult and
complex issue. The most obvious way to make this distinction would be to rely
on the traditional difference between hate speech and ordinary expression, a
difference that is incorporated into the positive law of many countries. . . .
Measured by this standard, the Danish cartoons seem to me rather far from
legally prohibited hate speech. They take a position on issues of obvious public
moment, but they do not advocate discrimination or oppression or violence; they
do not threaten; they do not use race epithets or names; they do not attack
individuals; they do not perpetuate an obvious untruth; they do not portray
Muslims as without human dignity. They may exacerbate stereotypes and
exaggerations, but that is not the same as hate speech. That is simply the nature
of most ideas.

—Robert Post1
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published
twelve editorial cartoons depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad leading to
widespread and violent protests both in Denmark and across the Islamic world.2
The controversy has generated a torrent of commentary seeking to define and
defend competing conceptions of the normative implications of the affair. For
some, the controversy has been emblematic of the incommensurable divide in
democratic societies between the liberal value of free speech on the one hand and
a religious taboo (the objection to blasphemy) on the other.3 For others, the whole
affair is better understood in terms of the socio-political context of Muslim
minorities living in European nation-states and perceived differences between
“Europe” or “the West” and “Islam”—each conceived as a distinct civilizational
nomos “championing opposing values: democracy, secularism, liberty, and
reason on the one side, and on the other the many opposites—tyranny, religion,
authority, and violence.”4 Still for others, the publication of the cartoons is better
seen as attributable to increasing Islamophobia and discrimination against
Muslims in Europe and North America in the wake of September 11 and is
“reminiscent of the anti-Semitic propaganda leveled at another minority in
European history.”5
1. Robert Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 72, 84
(2007).
2. The cartoons portrayed the Prophet Muhammad as, inter alia, a bomb-throwing terrorist and
suicide bomber. See generally JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD (2009).
3. Saba Mahmood, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?, in IS
CRITIQUE SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 64, 64 (Talal Asad et al. eds., 2009) (noting
that a series of international events, particularly around Islam, is leading some scholars to posit “an
incommensurable divide between strong religious beliefs and secular values” and that events such as
9/11, the ensuing War on Terror, and the rise of religious politics globally are “often seen as further
evidence of this incommensurability”).
4. Talal Asad, Free Speech, Blasphemy and Secular Criticism, in IS CRITIQUE SECULAR? BLASPHEMY,
INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 20, 21 (Talal Asad et al. eds., 2009).
5. See Mahmood, supra note 3, at 840; see also Tariq Modood, Obstacles to Multicultural
Integration, 44 INT’L MIGRATION 51, 51–61 (2006); Maleiha Malik, Muslims are Getting the Same Treatment
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Each of these narratives captures an aspect of what is at stake in the
controversy. The focus of this Article is narrower. The question addressed is how
liberal democratic states ought to respond to visible manifestations of hatred,
especially speech that constitutes incitement to religious hatred. The Article’s
concern is thus a contested and overlapping normative gray area lying between
extreme or hate speech on the one hand, and discrimination, hostility, or violence
on the basis of religion on the other.
The notion that persons have a right to be free from incitement to religious
hatred is recognized in the laws of most modern democracies6 and international
human rights conventions.7 It encounters fierce resistance in American law,
however, and in the jurisprudence interpreting the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution in particular. Conventional constitutional wisdom is that the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses together forbid legal restriction of the kind of
speech encapsulated by the Danish cartoons. This is for three general reasons.
First, while the state has a legitimate interest in preventing discrimination
against Muslims, this objective is distinct from the interest in prohibiting and
preventing speech that Muslims find offensive. The difficulty with suppressing
even hateful speech is that this requires a content-based restriction, which, at
least since the publication of John Stuart Mill’s classic argument in On Liberty,
has been held to violate free speech as a liberal principle.8 The only ground for
limiting such speech is the line drawn in Brandenburg v. Ohio of speech which is
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action.”9
Second, contrary to several decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights and calls by Islamic states to prevent the “defamation of religions and
prophets,”10 persons do not have a right not to be insulted in their religious
beliefs and offensive speech of this kind should not be understood as inhibiting
the right freely to practice one’s religion. This argument rests on a particular
account of the right to freedom of religion and belief and a distinctive theory of
toleration which holds that liberal democracy “does not require toleration in the

as Jews Had a Century Ago, GUARDIAN, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/feb/02/comment.religion1/print
(noting
parallels
between characterizations of Muslims in Europe today and Jews in the 1930s: as “religious bigots,
aliens, and a blight on European civilization”).
6. See infra text accompanying note 24.
7. See infra text accompanying note 23.
8. For Greenawalt, the principle of “no content regulation” (i.e. that some messages should not
be favored over others) has emerged as a “central doctrine of First Amendment law.” KENT
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 16 (1995).
9. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
10. On the basis that defamation of religions is inconsistent with the right to freedom of
expression, the Organization of the Islamic Conference has called for “legally-binding” United
Nations resolutions to “prevent defamation of religion and prophets” and to “render all acts
whatsoever defaming Islam as ‘offensive acts’ and subject to punishment.” On Eliminating Hatred
and Prejudice Against Islam, Thirty-third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Res. No. 26/33-P
(June 19–21, 2006). Fifty-seven member states of the OIC have had long standing concerns regarding
the “defamation of religions.” The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has passed resolutions
annually since 1999 on Combating Defamation of Religions. See Combating Defamation of Religions,
G.A. Res. 2005/3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.6 (Apr. 12, 2005).
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sense that persons abandon their independent evaluation of the beliefs and ideas
of others.”11
Third, by limiting free speech in order to suppress blasphemy, the state
“loses democratic legitimacy with respect to those who do not believe in the
truths protected by a law of blasphemy.”12 Implicit in this argument is a
particular conception of the liberal subject and a particular theory of democracy
linking free speech to the flourishing of self-government.13 At a deeper level, the
argument rests on a theory of political legitimacy under which hate speech laws
are seen to imperil the legitimacy of other legitimate laws against violence and
discrimination.
Taking the Danish cartoons controversy as its point of departure, this
Article interrogates the normative assumptions underlying these conceptions of
free speech and freedom of religion and considers what such an inquiry reveals
about both the contingency and particularity of First Amendment law. What is
silenced or rendered mute when issues such as the Danish cartoons are analyzed
in this way through the prism of liberal rights? Might international legal norms
and dominant understandings of the world community complicate the selfassuredness of liberal assumptions and open up new spaces and divergent
pathways for navigating difference and responding to the claims of Muslim
communities? If First Amendment jurisprudence is committed to an account of
secular liberalism that is no longer able to deny being more than one claim
among others, how might we take philosophical stock of the confrontation
between secular-liberal and Muslim-identitarian commitments to such values as
the freedom from injury to religious feelings or sensibilities?
In addressing these questions, this Article intervenes in the extant literature
by suggesting two distinct dialectical moves, each premised on the distinction
between internal and external reasons in philosophical argument, which have the
capacity to unsettle the static secular-religious binary and purportedly
incommensurable divide between liberal and Islamic values discussed above.
The argument proceeds as follows: What characterizes classical arguments for
secular liberal principles advanced by thinkers as diverse as Mill, Locke, Kant
and Rawls is the assumption that there are external reasons that all rational
people should be bound by, simply in virtue of their rationality. The difficulty is
that while rationality is a shared human faculty, there are no such uncontested
external or a priori universal reasons. All reasons appeal, at some level of
justification, to substantive value commitments and these may or may not be
shared by persons of divergent religious and cultural backgrounds. As Akeel
Bilgrami has suggested:
[I]t won’t do to say that those who are not convinced by secular liberal ideals are
failing to be illuminated by some clear light of reason. It is a theoretical fallacy to
declare the opponents of secular liberalism irrational by standards of rationality
which all rational people accept. Finding them wrong requires finding them
wrong by the light of some of their own values. This is what I . . . [have] called

11. Post, supra note 1, at 79–80.
12. Id. at 78.
13. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (Harper & Bros. 1960) (1948).
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“internal” reasons by which one can show them to be wrong, by contrast with
what . . . is simply unavailable: “external” reasons, which all rational people are
supposed to accept, not because of any substantive values they hold but because
these external reasons precisely make no appeal to other substantive values of
theirs; they make appeal only to their capacities to think rationally.14

If correct, two important consequences follow. First, classical liberal
arguments for free speech and freedom of religion are indeed efforts to provide
external reasons, or even a single principled reason, which all rational people
should accept. Such arguments must concede, however, that they rely on and
indeed mask internal reasons which are in turn dependent on substantive value
commitments. Failure to recognize the limits of rationality by dogmatically
asserting external reasons in the face of their contestability—the optimistic
cosmopolitan belief in the “reconcilability of all human values in a single,
harmonious unity”—can lead only to the illusion, of which Isaiah Berlin once
spoke, of the possibility of a final solution: the prospect that mankind can be
made “just and happy and creative and harmonious forever,” for which no price
is too high to pay.15
The loss of external reasons, however, is a necessary but not sufficient
condition. Unlike external reasons, internal reasons may not be present in all
persons and thus in cases of disagreement over value commitments we may
indeed face the dreaded specter of a relativist impasse, i.e. a situation where
there are no internal reasons two persons can give to each other. A liberal may
thus agree that free speech is ultimately justified by internal reasons and rests on
substantive values, but assert that these are the right reasons and values all the
same. It is only if she has an internal conflict, some other value which is in tension
with her commitment to free speech, that the liberal will be reachable by
someone advancing internal reasons that appeal to her liberal values in an effort
to persuade her to change her mind on some disputed evaluative issue.16
This Article argues that this is the real importance of the Danish cartoons:
not what they teach us about Islamic norms and values (although they may do
this), but rather how they raise unsettling questions regarding core features of
secular modernity and the place of religion in liberal democratic orders,
especially in regard to the epistemology of legal categories pertaining to religious
toleration and value pluralism.17 In much the same way international human
rights norms provide a critical mirror by which to illuminate certain cultural and
historical assumptions internal to American constitutional law, and liberal
theorizing more broadly, that continue to shape and define the contours of the

14. Akeel Bilgrami, Secularism and Relativism, 31 BOUNDARY 2, Summer 2004, at 173, 175.
15. STEVEN LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERSITY 90 (2003).
16. The principled impasse of relativism is thus conceivable only where “someone with whom
one is disagreed over values is not merely never inconsistent . . . they would also have to be wholly
without any tension or dissonance in their values and desires.” Bilgrami, supra note 14, at 186.
Bilgrami suggests that this would be an “extraordinary condition to find in any value-economy” and
would require the two parties in a dispute over a value to be “monsters of coherence.” Id.
17. See infra Part IV. See generally Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of
Religious Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 21–25 (2008); Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets
and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249,
292–96 (2008).
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Religion and Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. For such a discussion even
to begin, however, the two notions of loss of external reasons and existing
tension or conflict between internal reasons each must be acknowledged.
Assuming this space for dialogue and contestation can be opened in the
Self, the second dialectical move involves the question of how to understand and
interpret the claims of the Other. The first point is to accede that Islamic (and
other religious) arguments for the restriction of blasphemy (as yet undefined)
rest on internal reasons and substantive value commitments. But given the
unavailability of external reasons, this alone provides no reason to reject such
arguments’ claims to objectivity, toleration, or respect. What has been most
striking about the Danish cartoons controversy has been how the deep sense of
injury expressed by so many Muslims at seeing the Prophet Muhammad
depicted as a terrorist has literally been incomprehensible within Euro-Atlantic
modernity. Following the work of Saba Mahmood, this Article thus asks what
constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity in the modern world and
what practices may be necessary to make this kind of injury of religious pain not
mute but intelligible within the discourse of liberal rights?18
Answering these questions requires us to appreciate the difference between
particular modalities of belief and hermeneutics within distinct religious
traditions. As observed by Wendy Brown, “[w]ithout an appreciation of this
difference, the offence and injury that the cartoons caused for many remained
unarticulated and unrecognized; the debates remained locked in an unreflexive
and one-sided hermeneutic taken to be the only hermeneutic.”19 This Article’s
suggestive title “Defaming Muhammad” is thus a gesture to an elusive
intermediate position reducible to neither defaming Islam qua religion nor
Muslims qua persons. Such a reflexive hermeneutic becomes intelligible only
once we appreciate particular Islamic conceptions of devotion and piety and of
an intimate living relationship of veneration, emulation, and embodied
habitation that many Muslims have with the Prophet.
But as before, this is a necessary, not sufficient condition. In order to seek to
persuade Muslims in evaluative disputes to change their substantive value
commitments, it is further necessary to advance internal reasons which appeal to
Islamic values and norms and to pay close attention to how legal restrictions and
competing conceptions of right seem from the internal point of view of Islam itself.
As increasingly recognized by leading liberal20 and international human rights21
18. Mahmood, supra note 3, at 70–71. Mahmood notes that “the motivations for the international
protests were notoriously heterogeneous, and [that] it is impossible to explain them through a single
causal narrative.” Id. at 70. Some scholars, for example, have argued that the Muslim reaction to the
cartoons was more the result of an orchestrated campaign by political actors with vested interests and
opportunism by Islamic extremists than any spontaneous emotional reaction. See KLAUSEN, supra note
2. This Article pursues only the narrower question of intelligibility of moral injury.
19. Wendy Brown, Introduction, in IS CRITIQUE SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 1,
17 (Talal Asad et al. eds., 2009).
20. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Toleration and Reasonableness, in THE CULTURE OF TOLERATION IN
DIVERSE SOCIETIES: REASONABLE TOLERANCE 13, 14–15 (Catriona McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds.,
2003) (suggesting that there is no way to say that a “set of permissions is adequate for the practice of
a religion except by paying attention to how that set of restrictions seems from the internal point of
view of the religion” and that an “externally stated adequacy condition—which was quite at odds
with internal conceptions—would be arbitrary and unmotivated”); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF
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theorists alike, this is the only viable path for rights discourse and the only way
to open up new potential fusions of horizons and spaces for dialogue on “the
irreducible and interrelated problems of equality and culture.”22
The Article proceeds in three parts. After first setting out the notion of
incitement to religious hatred in Part I, Part II considers the relationship between
free speech, group libel, and human dignity and argues that the notion of dignity
lying at the heart of group defamation laws destabilizes classical accounts of
freedom of expression. Part III addresses the complex historical and normative
relationship between free speech and freedom of religion in liberal democratic
orders and considers the two critical questions of whether the Danish cartoons
give rise to a genuine conflict of rights and how to understand the notion of
harm. Part IV then discusses how the analysis in the previous two parts shapes
competing liberal accounts of religious toleration. The Article concludes by
reflecting on what a more robust account of reflexive toleration might look like
premised on notions of mutual justification and peaceful coexistence between rival
ways of life and recognition of the need to pay attention to how legal restrictions
seem from the internal point of view of a religious tradition.
II. GROUP DEFAMATION AND HUMAN DIGNITY
A. Incitement to Religious Hatred
The notion of incitement to religious hatred is notoriously difficult to define.
On the one hand, antidiscrimination law is premised on a right of persons to be
treated equally in certain spheres of life. On the other hand, hate speech laws are
directed towards speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of certain
shared characteristics. There is clearly an overlap between these categories: e.g.
certain types of hate speech (such as inflammatory political speech) may be said
to amount to or constitute evidence of discrimination, while certain non-spoken
discriminatory conduct or behavior (such as cross-burning) may be said to
amount to hate speech. The leading international human rights treaty describes
the idea as follows: “Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence shall be prohibited
by law.”23 It is also codified in various forms of hate speech legislation in
countries around the world, including most Western liberal democracies. As
recently noted by Jeremy Waldron, this includes
legislation of the sort you will find in England, Canada, France, Denmark,
Germany, New Zealand, and in some of the states of Australia, prohibiting
statements ‘by which a group of people are threatened, insulted or degraded on
PEOPLES 78 (1999) (arguing that the “alternative is a fatalistic cynicism which conceives the good of
life solely in terms of power”).
21. See, e.g., ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION (1990) (arguing
for acceptance of the concept and content of a human rights regime through internal cultural
legitimation in an Islamic context).
22. James Tully, The Illiberal Liberal: Brian Barry’s Polemical Attack on Multiculturalism, in
MULTICULTURALISM RECONSIDERED: CULTURE AND EQUALITY AND ITS CRITICS 102, 104 (Paul Kelly ed.,
2002).
23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 20, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].

Danchin_final_1.doc (Do Not Delete)

12 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

5/19/2010 1:27:31 PM

Vol. 2:5 2010

account of their race, color, national or ethnic origin,’ or prohibiting attempts to
incite racial or religious hatred.24

In the United States, hate speech legislation of this kind has traditionally
been held to be unconstitutional.25 The logic of free speech jurisprudence is that
“debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”26 This
idea makes little sense unless individuals can aggressively present their views to
others—even to those for whom the views are unwelcome or upsetting. The First
Amendment has thus been held to protect all religious polemic from legal
sanction—even expression that aims “deliberately and provocatively to assault
the religious sensibilities of the pious.”27 On this basis, the United States entered
a reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) stating that Article 20 “does not authorize or require legislation or
other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”28
This stance is generally defended29 in terms of the weight that American
constitutional law places on free speech—what the Supreme Court in Palko v.
Connecticut referred to as “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of [freedom].”30 The notion that free speech and freedom of
conscience are supreme constitutional values is further defended in terms of
24. Jeremy Waldron, Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School: Why Call Hate Speech Group
Libel? (Oct. 5–7, 2009) (referring to Article 266b of the Danish Penal Code and an English statute on
hate speech).
25. Interpretation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment has historically been
guided by “principles of facial neutrality that disfavor the government’s use of express content-based
classifications,” and thus free speech doctrine “only protects expression qua expression, without
regard for its social meaning to certain audiences or the identity of the speaker.” Murad Hussain,
Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to
Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 946–47 (2008) (citing Robert C. Post, Racist Speech,
Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 293–94 (1991)). Hussain argues that
this “‘profound individualism’ is shaped by ‘a tendency [in American law] to view groups as mere
collections of individuals, whose claims are no greater than those of their constituent members.” Id.
An example of a law held to be unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds is R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (overturning a cross-burning conviction under a municipal hate crimes
ordinance and finding the law facially unconstitutional because prohibiting the use of fighting words
only “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”).
26. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
27. Post, supra note 1, at 73. Post refers to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Cantwell v.
Connecticut as authority for this proposition. Id. He does note, however, that the First Amendment is
exceptional in this respect and that in Europe “there is a long history of regulating blasphemy, and as
a consequence the question of subjecting the cartoons to legal sanction is very much alive.” Id.
28. U.S. RESERVATIONS, DECLARATIONS, AND UNDERSTANDINGS, INT’L COVENANT ON CIV. AND
POL. RTS, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (Apr. 2, 1992).
29. However, on September 25, 2009 the United States and Egypt tabled a draft General
Assembly resolution on Freedom of Opinion and Expression that, while including no exception for
“defamation of religions,” provides in paragraph four that the Human Rights Council expresses its
concern that “incidents of racial and religious intolerance, discrimination and related violence, as well
as negative stereotyping of religions and racial groups continue to rise around the world, and
condemns, in this context, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, and urges States to take effective measures,
consistent with their international human rights obligations, to address and combat such incidents.”
G.A. Res. Draft, U.N Doc. A/HRC/12/L.14 (Sept. 25, 2009).
30. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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deeply entrenched narratives of American exceptionalism and Enlightenment
accounts of individual freedom, self-realization, and autonomy. The discussion
that follows seeks to foreground an alternative notion of exceptionalism: one that
views these narratives as outlier or relativist positions of the disreputable sort31
that fail to take seriously both particular types of harm and the plurality of
values at stake, especially in the case of Muslims living in Western democratic
societies.
A prominent example of such a narrative is Robert Post’s argument in
relation to the Danish cartoons that short of speech being directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action (the Brandenburg threshold32), the state does
not have an interest in prohibiting speech that Muslims find offensive.33 But why
is incitement to imminent violence the correct standard as opposed to Article 20(2)
of the ICCPR34 or Section 1 of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (United
Kingdom),35 which both prohibit speech intended to incite racial or religious
hatred? Whose harm exactly is at issue here? Is it the harm caused by
suppressing speech or the harm caused by the speech itself (or both) that should
be our critical concern? Whose ox exactly is being gored?
The first point to note is that in Post’s analysis the controversy is not
portrayed as a conflict between fundamental rights. Rather, the conflict is
portrayed as between a fundamental right on the one hand—free speech
understood as a principle essential to modern freedom—and the charge of
blasphemy on the other. Blasphemy is then portrayed as an archaic and coercive
religious constraint which the United States (although not European nationstates) has managed to transcend, but which Islamic states and Muslims still
cling to in their unwillingness or inability to grasp the supreme value of freedom.
Post cites in this regard Harry Kalven’s well-known statement that “In America,
there is no heresy, no blasphemy”36 and reiterates conventional constitutional
wisdom which holds that speech in public discourse be vigorously protected,
even speech which intentionally targets religious sensibilities and causes
emotional pain, distress, and outrage.37
Thus for Post either (1) the free speech principle alone provides the means
by which to resolve the controversy or (2) other rights such as to freedom of
religion or human dignity are simply assumed either (a) to be compatible with
free speech a priori, or (b) in cases of conflict, to be normatively inferior. This way
of framing the problem is unhelpful to understanding those who complain about
blasphemy and to finding peaceful and just means of resolving such conflicts.
Following the logic of reasoning set out above, the first position must either
concede its dependence on internal reasons and substantive value commitments
or risk the charge of obduracy. The second position opens the possibility,
31. Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal Claim, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305, 307–08
(1999) (distinguishing reputable from disreputable forms of cultural relativism).
32. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
33. Post, supra note 1, at 82.
34. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 20(3).
35. Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c.1 (Eng.) [hereinafter RRHA].
36. HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 7 (Jamie Kalven ed.,
1988).
37. Post, supra note 1, at 73.

Danchin_final_1.doc (Do Not Delete)

14 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

5/19/2010 1:27:31 PM

Vol. 2:5 2010

however, of dialogue on tensions internal to liberal rights discourse between
competing conceptions of fundamental rights and their normative
interrelationship. Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn.
B. Free Speech and Blasphemy
By framing the controversy in terms of a conflict between free speech and
offense to the religious sensibilities of Muslims, the outcome of Post’s analysis is
predetermined. Freedom must prevail as against superstition, intolerance, and
irrationality. There can be no place in a secular liberal society for blasphemy as a
religious crime—the idea of “treason against God”38—or indeed any laws
“protecting the respect properly due to God.”39 This argument rests on two
assumptions: first, that the free speech principle is justified by external or
universal reasons to which all rational persons should be bound simply in virtue
of their rationality; second, that Islamic norms requiring the suppression of
blasphemy are premised on internal or subjective reasons that some persons may
share and others may not and which therefore cannot impose constraints on the
rights of others.40 It is the first of these assumptions that is our concern here; the
second is considered in Part III below.
As Post rightly notes there are many distinct justifications for protection of
free speech, arguably the most prominent of which is the argument from
democratic self-governance.41 Accordingly, “[i]f public policy is to be directed by
an intelligently informed public opinion . . . [citizens] must be free to express and
discuss their perspectives on the matters satirized in the Jyllands-Posten
cartoons.”42 What is critical to appreciate is that, despite appealing to no
substantive moral or political values in its premises, such classical liberal
arguments regarding non-interference in the lives of citizens depend upon
essentially-contested propositions regarding the nature of truth and progress. It
is not possible here to explain in full how such abstract, externally-stated
propositions rest on internal reasons and substantive value commitments. But for
present purposes, Bilgrami’s incisive critique of John Stuart Mill’s meta-inductive
argument for free speech illustrates the point.
For Bilgrami, Mill’s argument in On Liberty has two premises: “(1) our own
past opinions have been wrong, and (2) our present opinions may therefore also
38. See LEONARD W. LEVY, TREASON AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE OF BLASPHEMY
(1981).
39. Post, supra note 1, at 77.
40. It is important to note, as explained by Asad, that “blasphemy” strictly speaking is a category
which defines an “outrageous ‘religious’ transgression in the Christian tradition.” Asad, supra note 4,
at 37. The theological term tajdīf is often translated in English to mean “blasphemy,” but in Arabic it
has the sense of “scoffing at God’s bounty.” Id. at 38. Like similar words such as kufr (“apostasy,
blasphemy, infidelity”); ridda (“apostasy”); fisq (“moral depravity”); and ilhād (“heresy, apostasy”),
these terms overlap but are not synonymous with the English term blasphemy. Id. They also do not
apply to non-Muslims and thus were not used by Arabic speakers in response to the Danish cartoons.
Id. Rather, the World Union of Muslim scholars used the word isā’ah which has a range of meanings
including “insult, harm and offense” that apply in secular contexts. Id. In seeking to understand the
nature, scope, and justifications of the constraints imposed by Islamic norms, it is critical to
appreciate these distinctions. I am grateful to Saba Mahmood for discussion on this point.
41. Post, supra note 1, at 73. See discussion infra Part IV.
42. Post, supra note 1, at 77.
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be wrong, despite our conviction in them. From these premises [Mill’s argument]
concludes (3) that we should tolerate dissent against our current opinions just in
case they are wrong and the dissenting opinion is right.”43 The basic facts of past
error and current epistemic fallibility are things that any rational person will
accept and lead inexorably to the evaluative conclusion that all dissenting
opinions should be tolerated because they might be true. But as Bilgrami acutely
observes, the first premise (that our past opinions have been wrong) is stated
from the point of view of our present opinions. How then can we “be diffident in
holding our present opinions in the way that the second premise requires us to
be”? We may well be diffident about our present opinions, but to that extent “the
first premise is that much shakier than Mill presents it.”44
What if we say instead that Mill’s argument does not require us to be
skeptical regarding all our current beliefs; that in fact we “make epistemological
progress, and cumulatively build up on a fund of truths via rejecting past
convictions in the course of the history of inquiry;” and thus we can at least have
confidence “in our current judgments about our past beliefs being false.”45 Again,
however, this maneuver is unable to rescue Mill’s argument from its noncredible epistemology. The underlying difficulty is that the “pervasive diffidence
which we are supposed to have in our opinions . . . is due to a conception of truth
which has it that we can never know when we have achieved the truth for any belief.”46
Mill’s argument for free speech in this way requires us to accept that we
should seek the Truth, but that we can never be confident we have attained what
we epistemologically seek.47 There is a deep tension between these two
propositions, a tension to which the sheer fact of being rational provides no
apparent solution without appealing to further substantive moral or political
values such as the virtues of a society characterized by a diversity of opinion.48
But having acknowledged this, we are now in the sphere of internal reasons
which opens up space for dialogue on substantive values and justifications for
tolerating different dissenting opinions.49 As a conceptual matter, the argument
for publishing the cartoons now stands on the same normative ground as the

43. Bilgrami, supra note 14, at 177.
44. Id. at 178.
45. If there are beliefs whose truth epistemic progress via falsification allows confidence, then to
that extent free speech need not be necessary—at least regarding them. But Mill will not permit any
exceptions to free speech for some beliefs. He will not allow, for example, that our convictions (now
held with confidence) that certain beliefs are false are immune from his conclusion about tolerance
and free speech. Id. at 179.
46. Id. at 179–80.
47. The argument is not that we cannot attain the truth; only that we cannot ever know that we
have attained it. One could then relinquish truth as a goal of inquiry and seek something less than the
truth. But as Bilgrami notes, “[i]f truth, the property of beliefs we never are confident we have
achieved, is no longer a goal of inquiry, if it is replaced by something weaker which we can be
confident of having achieved when we have achieved it, then Mill loses his premises altogether.” Id.
at 181.
48. Id.
49. On the basis of value-based reasoning and international and comparative legal analysis,
Waldron thus reaches the conclusion that the content-based restriction doctrine is a “blind-alley” and
example of “path-dependency” in First Amendment jurisprudence. Jeremy Waldron, Holmes
Lectures at Harvard Law School: Libel and Legitimacy (Oct. 5–7, 2009).
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argument for suppressing their publication. A further set of arguments is needed
for the inquiry to continue.
C. Group Libel and Human Dignity
Before turning to the complex issues of religious piety and sanctity and
whether substantive values of this kind are properly protected by the right to
freedom of religion and belief, we are yet to address the question raised above:
Whose harm exactly is at issue here? Post is surely correct that suppressing
provocative and polemical speech targeting the religious sensibilities of the pious
may cause harm to speakers by limiting their liberty and restricting the diversity
and vibrancy of opinions in society. Even if we concede this, however, what
about the harm which such speech may cause to its targets? How does this harm
factor into a liberal algebra of individual rights?
Here we can see the kind of tension internal to secular liberalism to which
Bilgrami alludes. Individual liberty is not the only substantive value at stake.
There is at least one other important justification for suppressing speech which
may not rise to the level of inciting imminent violence but nonetheless seeks to
stir up religious hatred: the notion of human dignity and the need to protect
social groups from certain forms of group libel or defamation. As Waldron has
argued, legal restrictions on hate speech
are not restrictions on thinking; they are restrictions on more tangible forms of
message. The issue is publication and the harm done to individuals and groups
through the disfiguring of our social environment by visible, public and semipermanent announcements to the effect that in the opinion of one group in the
community, perhaps the majority, members of another group are not worthy of
equal citizenship.50

Germany’s penal code thus prohibits attacks on human dignity by insulting,
maliciously maligning, or defaming part of the population.51 A specific French
provision prohibits defamation of groups.52 The Canadian province of Manitoba
has a defamation statute which proscribes the “publication of a libel against a
race, religious creed, or sexual orientation.”53 British laws forbid the expression
of racial or religious hatred.54 And Australian federal legislation prohibits actions
that insult, humiliate, or intimidate a group of people because of their race, color,
or national or ethnic origin.55

50. Waldron, supra note 24, at 5.
51. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] Nov. 13, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] 945, § 130(1)(2). See also
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1153, 1181
(2004).
52. Loi nº 81-637 du 29 juillet 1881, art. 29 (prohibiting group and individual defamation).
53. Defamation Act, R.S.M., ch. D 20 (1987) (prohibiting “[t]he publication of a libel against a
race, religious creed or sexual orientation, likely to expose persons belonging to the race, professing
the religious creed, or having the sexual orientation to hatred, contempt or ridicule, and tending to
raise unrest or disorder among the people”).
54. The Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64 § 18 (Eng.).
55. Racial Hatred Act, 1995 (Cth.). See also The Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, s 1
(VIC) (noting that vilifying conduct diminishes the “dignity, sense of self-worth and belonging to the
community” of individuals and groups and is contradictory to the principle of democracy).

Danchin_final_1.doc (Do Not Delete)

5/19/2010 1:27:31 PM

DEFAMING MUHAMMAD

17

In the United States, the Supreme Court upheld the idea of group libel in
1952 in Beauharnais v. Illinois.56 In addition, various states have historically
enacted group libel statutes in their criminal codes proscribing the holding up to
ridicule, hatred, or contempt any group or class of people because of their race,
color, or religion.57 Since the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan58 and ensuing cases, however, the status of Beauharnais and the whole
notion of group libel as an exception to protected speech under the First
Amendment has been in doubt.59
For Waldron, the key to understanding the notion of group defamation lies
in the concept of the dignity of the persons affected—dignity “in the sense of their
basic social standing, the basis of their recognition as social equals and as bearers
of human rights and constitutional entitlements.”60 A well-ordered democratic
state must be concerned with upholding and vindicating important aspects of the
legal and social status of its citizens. Thus, laws regarding group libel are set up
to “vindicate public order, not just by preempting violence, but by upholding
against attack a shared, public sense of the basic elements of each person’s status,
dignity, and reputation as a citizen or member of society—particularly against
attacks predicated upon the characteristics of some particular social group.”61
While laws against racial or religious defamation are framed in terms of group
reputation, they are not ultimately concerned with groups per se, but rather with
the basic social standing of individual members of groups. In this respect, the
concern is ultimately individualistic: such laws “look instead to the basics of
social standing and to the association that is made . . . between the denigration of
that social standing and some characteristic associated more or less ascriptively
with the group.”62
Waldron agrees with Post that while offense and dignity are closely related
and often entangled in complex ways when a racial or religious group is
hatefully denigrated, they are not the same thing. He thus supports Post’s claim
that deeply offensive, distressing and even assaultive speech may justifiably be
protected in a well-ordered democracy.63 But this alone does not end the inquiry.
It does not answer, for example, the question of whether visible manifestations of

56. 343 U.S. 250, 251, 267 (1952) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the
publication or exhibition of any writing or picture portraying the “depravity, criminality, unchastity,
or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion”).
57. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-37 (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-1 (1961); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 272, § 98c (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.510 (1979). See
also Kenneth Lasson, In Defense of Group-Libel Laws, or Why the First Amendment Should Not Protect
Nazis, 2 HUM. RTS. ANN. 289, 298 (1985).
58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59. But cf. Waldron, supra note 24, at 19 (arguing that “it is not at all clear why the reasoning in
New York Times v. Sullivan should protect the defendant in the Beauharnais case”).
60. Id. at 15.
61. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Thus, “[m]embers may belong ascriptively to a group by virtue of
some shared characteristics: race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, and national origin.” Id. at 14.
In this respect, group defamation “sets out to make [group membership] a liability by denigrating
group-defining characteristics or associating them with bigoted factual claims that are fundamentally
defamatory. A prohibition on group defamation, then, is a way of blocking that enterprise.” Id. at 16.
63. See infra Part III.D.
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hatred directed towards racial and religious groups (especially vulnerable
minorities) should be suppressed on the grounds of vindicating a basic
conception of public order premised on the equal dignity and status of persons.
Entirely internal to liberal argument, Waldron’s notion of dignity as lying at
the core of group defamation laws destabilizes Post’s one-sided framing of the
cartoons controversy. Waldron shows, persuasively in my view, why the free
speech principle may need to be limited in certain circumstances, and why
dignity and the rights and freedoms of others may provide a sufficient and
necessary justification to do so. Whether the Danish cartoons meet this threshold
may be doubted.64 But the critical issue is how we understand and give meaning
to notions of “dignity” and the “rights and freedoms of others,” especially in this
context the right to freedom of religion and belief. It is to these questions we can
now turn.
III. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF
The discussion in Part II argues that it is a conceptual error to view the
suppression of blasphemy and speech inciting religious hatred more generally
solely in terms of the threat they may pose to the freedom of individual speakers.
Blasphemy, for example, may also be viewed as violence done to deeply valued
human relations and thus to the limits that define particular kinds of freedom.
The difficulty, as Talal Asad has observed, is that
[a]ngry Muslim responses to the publication of the Danish cartoons are seen by
secularists as attempting to reintroduce a category that was once a means of
oppression in Europe, while they see themselves critiquing, in the name of
freedom, the power to suppress human freedom. For the worldly critic, there can
be no acceptable taboos. When limits are critiqued, taboos disappear and
freedom is expanded.65

The word freedom is doing a great deal of work here and needs carefully to
be unpacked. The first puzzle concerns justified limits on the free speech
principle. In First Amendment jurisprudence, limitations are well-accepted: laws
and judicial decisions relating to fighting words, defamatory speech, obscenity,
and indecency; laws relating to child pornography; and copyright and patent
laws all impose restrictions on freedom of expression.66 It is thus not the
constraint per se that seems intolerable, but rather the reasons for, and terms in
which, the constraint is articulated. What does this particular array of restrictions
and configuration of free speech doctrine tell us about liberal conceptions of
human freedom?
64. For Waldron, exercise of the right to publish the cartoons by the editors of Jyllands-Posten
was “fatuous, unnecessary and offensive” but the cartoons “make some sort of twisted contribution .
. . and I believe they should be tolerated as such.” Waldron, supra note 49, at 16; cf. Geert Wilders,
Party for Freedom, Contribution to the Parliamentary Debate on Islamic Activism, http://
www.geertwilders.nl/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1214 (comparing the Qur’an
to Hitler’s Mein Kampf and the film Fitna (meaning “strife” in Arabic), which juxtaposes Quranic
verses with images of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks).
65. Asad, supra note 4, at 55.
66. See, e.g., William van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107,
121–25 (1982) (noting that the category of “‘the’ freedom of speech” does not include perjury,
obscenity, defamation, fighting words, commercial fraud, criminal solicitation, etc.).
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In order to answer this question, we need to understand the rise of the
liberal democratic state and secular modernity in the West and, in particular,
how the conceptual separation between public and private functions in liberal
theory. This is a formidable task, one well beyond the scope of this Article. For
present purposes, let me offer just a few observations.
A. The Public/Private Divide
The defining ideas of the liberal state are neutrality and a putative
public/private divide. Religion is seen as separated from the state and properly
understood to be within the private sphere. This leaves a “neutral” public sphere
that seeks to maintain its neutrality through rigorous commitment to a scheme of
individual rights. The state may thus have no cultural or religious projects or
indeed any collective goals of its own beyond the protection of the liberty and
security of its citizens.
These distinctions are often traced historically to the eighteenth century
Enlightenment. It was Immanuel Kant who in 1795 famously distinguished
between the public and private uses of reason: the idea that reason must be
“free” in its public use (aude sapere exercised in “broad daylight”) and
“submissive” in its private use (the subjection of reason to the particular ends in
view).67 But as Michel Foucault observed, this is “term for term, the opposite of
what is ordinarily called freedom of conscience.”68 Two centuries later, we see
the private sphere as a space of non-interference from state and religious
authority while the public sphere is viewed as a space where rationalism itself
imposes limits and constraints on freedom of thought, conscience, and speech—
what Foucault refers to as Kant’s “contract of rational despotism with free
reason: the public and free use of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee
of obedience, on condition, however, that the political principle that must be obeyed
itself be in conformity with universal reason.”69
Here we see perhaps the defining effort in modernity to use external
reasons to justify liberal notions of autonomy (the “public and free use of
autonomous reason”), neutrality (the “political principle”), and right (“universal
reason”) so as to bind all rational people simply in virtue of their rationality. The
difficulty is that each of these notions inexorably rest, and depend for their
coherence, upon distinctive and contingent internal reasons and substantive
values. The liberal-autonomous subject remains in part a religious subject, but
only in the private sphere where religion is tacitly assumed or (re)defined in
Protestant terms to take the form of private “belief or conscience.” As noted
above, the neutrality of the state then simultaneously mediates and circumscribes
this private sphere though a scheme of individual rights and the right to freedom
of religion and belief in particular. And the notion of secular or universal right is
encompassed in the categorical rationalism of the liberal algebra itself: “Act

67. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in WHAT IS
ENLIGHTENMENT? EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANSWERS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY QUESTIONS (James
Schmidt ed., 1996).
68. Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 32 (Paul Rabinow ed.,
1984).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
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externally in such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the
freedom of everyone according to a universal law.”70
Each of these propositions involve fraught and contested claims that in
effect define Enlightenment as the discovery of an exit, a “way out,” a “process
that releases us from the status of ‘immaturity’” (i.e. from a state where religious
authority takes the place of our conscience) by a “modification of the preexisting
relation linking will, authority, and the use of reason.”71 The consequences of
these complex moves for secular liberalism are well-described by Saba
Mahmood:
[C]ontrary to the ideological self-understanding of secularism (as the doctrinal
separation of religion and state), secularism has historically entailed the
regulation and re-formation of religious beliefs, doctrines, and practices to yield
a particular normative conception of religion (that is largely Protestant Christian in
its contours). Historically speaking, the secular state has not simply cordoned off
religion from its regulatory ambitions but sought to remake it through the
agency of the law. This remaking is shot through with tensions and paradoxes
that cannot simply be attributed to the intransigency of religionists (Muslims or
Christians).72

Mahmood notes that under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment,
courts constantly need to distinguish and decide which manifestations of
religious belief to recognize and accommodate when conflicts arise with “neutral
laws of general application.”73
A further consequence for liberal theory is the so-called “mind-action”
distinction which forms a core premise in liberal rights discourse. This applies as
much to claims of free speech as to freedom of religion. Freedom of thought and
conscience are each considered to be absolutely protected from interference by the
law, i.e. non-derogable and not subject to limitation.74 The right to manifest one’s
70. Waldron, supra note 20, at 14–15.
71. The idea that metaphysics was a “premise derived from another source” led to Kant’s
statement that “he needed to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith.” Pope Benedict XVI,
Address at University of Resenburg, Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections
(Sept. 12, 2006). The result was that he “anchored faith exclusively in practical reason, denying it
access to reality as a whole.” Id.
72. Mahmood, supra note 3, at 87. In this respect, the process of democratic self-government and
space of public debate can be seen not simply as a space of expression and rational deliberation but of
formation in which “both coercive, regulatory, and rhetorical power is necessary in order to produce
the right kind of citizen subject who can inhabit the norms of a liberal democratic polity. Contra Post,
the public sphere is not simply a domain of unhindered communication, but also a disciplinary space
that inhibits certain kinds of speech while enabling others, equipping people to hear specific types of
arguments while remaining deaf to others.” Saba Mahmood, Comments by Saba Mahmood on the Una’s
Lecture:
Religion
and
Freedom
of
Speech,
http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/pubs/
post_mahmood.pdf (emphasis added).
73. See, e.g., WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2007)
(analyzing the unsuccessful struggle of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish families to preserve the
practice of placing religious artifacts such as crosses and stars of David on the graves of a city-owned
burial ground).
74. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 20. Article 18(2) of the ICCPR provides that no person “shall be
subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his
choice.” Id. art. 18(2). The state, for example, is absolutely prohibited from proscribing membership of
certain religions under law; from coercing individuals to reveal their religion without consent; or
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thought or conscience in the form of speech or other action is, however, subject to
reasonable limitation by the state on certain specified grounds. There is a rich
jurisprudence at the domestic and international levels dealing with the fragile
and unstable divide between thought and conscience on the one hand, and action
related to belief on the other.75
We have seen above how hate speech laws, which impose limits on the
“public and free use of autonomous reason,” are thus justified on the dual
premises that (1) they leave the forum internum of thought and conscience
undisturbed, and (2) impose restrictions on speech only to the extent necessary to
protect the autonomy and dignity of others from visible manifestations of hatred.
Interestingly, Islamic law makes a similar distinction to justify the suppression of
blasphemy. It is a central tenet of Islam that there may be no coercion in matters
of religion.76 In Islamic law, Muslims remain free to believe whatever they wish
in matters of religious or other belief.77 Laws proscribing blasphemy limit only
the extent to which those beliefs can be publically acted upon in relation to the
rights and freedoms of other Muslims. There is a different normative
understanding, however, of the public sphere and of how religion and religious
belonging to a particular way of life (as distinct from religious belief per se) define
the limits and contours of political toleration.
On this understanding, blasphemy is not concerned so much with the
challenge of a new truth as “something that seeks to disrupt a living
relationship.”78 In this respect, Sharia does restrict the individual right to behave
as one wishes in public, but any notion of separation between “public” and
“private” spheres is differently understood than in the idealized liberal state.
Morality is not regarded solely as a private matter. In addition to what liberal
theory accepts as “time, manner, and place” restrictions in the public sphere,
religious morality and piety are accepted as imposing norms of appropriate
speech and behavior on the individual while, conversely, the “breaching of
‘private’ domains is disallowed in Islamic law.”79 In this sense, “the limits of
from using threats, physical force, or penal sanctions to compel individuals to adhere or recant to
certain religious beliefs. See BAHIYYIH G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF—ENSURING
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION 26 (1996).
75. For discussion of cases involving the belief-action distinction in the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights see Peter Danchin & Lisa Forman, The Evolving Jurisprudence of The
European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 192 (Peter G. Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole eds.,
2002); see also CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 74–79 (2001) (discussing the difficulties of the internal/external dichotomy in
European Court of Human Rights case law).
76. The Holy Qur’an 2:256 (“There is no compulsion in religion”); Id. 18:29 (“let him who wills
have faith, and him who wills reject it”).
77. Asad, supra note 4, at 39–40 (citing MUHAMMAD SALIM AL-‘AWWA, AL-HAQ FI AL-TA‘BĪR (THE
RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH) 23 (1998) (arguing that in the sharia “[f]reedom of belief means the right of
every human being to embrace whatever ideas and doctrines he wishes, even if they conflict with
those of the group in which he lives or to which he belongs, or conflicts with what the majority of its
members regard as true”)).
78. Asad thus notes that the “passionate reaction to ‘blasphemers’ is typically directed not at the
latter’s disbelief but at their alleged violence.” Asad, supra note 4, at 27.
79. Asad, supra note 4, at 17. As Asad acutely observes, the extent of legal regulation and
intervention into “domestic space” has expanded exponentially in the liberal welfare state as the
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freedom are differently articulated in relation to spaces that may roughly be
described as ‘private’ and ‘public,’ and different kinds of discourse are socially
available to distance what is repugnant, whether transcendent or worldly.”80 We
will never understand blasphemy if all we see in it is a threat to freedom as
opposed to a competing conception of freedom developed according to a different
understanding of the interrelationship between individual freedom and social
order.
B. Public Order
If the static external/internal dichotomy between free speech and
blasphemy is relinquished, how then should we understand laws which impose
restrictions on certain types of speech or incitement involving religion or belief
whether in European or Islamic states or elsewhere? Whether limits are imposed
on blasphemy, incitement to religious hatred, group libel, or defamation of
religion (each overlapping and raising complex and variegated questions of their
own), can such laws be viewed in certain contexts as seeking to vindicate public
order by upholding against attack a shared sense of the basic elements of status,
dignity, and reputation of members of a society?
In order to address this question, let us consider briefly recent debates and
reform efforts in the United Kingdom. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the
British Government introduced the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill
which sought inter alia to amend the Public Order Act 1986 to extend its
provisions on incitement to racial hatred to include incitement to religious
hatred.81 The effort failed in the House of Lords, but in 2005 the Government
reintroduced the Bill and Parliament finally enacted the Racial and Religious
Hatred Act 2006 which creates a new offense of stirring up hatred against
persons on religious grounds.82 Two years later, on May 8, 2008, the Criminal
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 abolished the common law offences of
blasphemy and blasphemous libel in England and Wales.83

boundaries of the citizen’s right to privacy, “on which her moral and civic freedom rests,” have been
significantly redrawn by “public” law to authorize ever more bureaucratic action in (formerly)
“private” domains. Id. at 36–37.
80. Id. at 37.
81. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, 2001, H.C. Bill [49] (Eng.). For discussion, see
Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to September
11?, 65 MODERN L.R. 724 (2002).
82. Religious hatred is defined in section 29A as “hatred against a group of persons defined by
reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.” RRHA, supra note 35, c.1, § 29A. The offense is
defined in Section 29B in terms of a “person who uses threatening words or behavior, or displays any
written material which is threatening . . . if he intends thereby to stir up religious hatred.” Id. § 29B.
For present purposes, it is important to note that section 29J of the Act expressly excludes
“discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular
religions or the beliefs and practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or
practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system
to cease practicing their religion or belief system.” Id. § 29J. See infra Part III.D for discussion of the
distinction between group libel and offense.
83. Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 2008, c. 4, § 79 (Eng.).
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Prior to their abolition, these offences extended only to the Church of
England and in certain respects to Christianity as a whole.84 The offenses had
consistently been upheld against challenge not only in the English courts, but
also in the European Court and Commission of Human Rights as being both nondiscriminatory and compatible with the right to free speech under the European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).85 But in recognition of increasing
Islamophobia and hostility towards Muslims and in light of longstanding calls
by reform bodies to abolish or amend the law relating to religious offenses, they
became subject to review by a House of Lords Select Committee during the 2003
debate over whether to introduce a new offence of incitement to religious hatred
which would have the effect of extending the law’s protection to Britain’s Islamic
and other religious communities.86 Interestingly, after an exhaustive debate the
Committee was unable to make any specific recommendations failing to
recommend either abolition of existing blasphemy laws or the creation of a new
offense of incitement to religious hatred.
As Ian Hunter notes, the underlying problem was the apparent
incompatibility between the language of the ECHR and the terms in which
European political and legal orders have historically dealt with the problems of
sectarian conflict and religious freedom.
As the inheritors of these settlements, liberal political and legal orders are not
involved in the game of balancing potentially conflicting rights, but in the quite
different task of adjusting degrees of freedom (whether of speech or religion) in
light of an assessment of the likely threats to personal and state security arising.87

The Committee thus acknowledged that its judgments must be informed by
the need to ensure continued stability, tranquility, and mutual tolerance between
major religious groups and secular segments of society, and equality of

84. In R. v. Lemon [1979] 1 All E.R. 898, 921–22, Lord Scarman criticized blasphemous libel at
common law on the grounds that it did not extend to “protect the religious beliefs and feelings of
non-Christians” (which was necessary in an “increasingly plural society such as that of modern
Britain”) but rather belonged to a “group of criminal offences designed to safeguard the internal
tranquility of the kingdom.” The rationale for the limited scope of the offences is related to the
historical relationship between the state and nation (which is dominantly Protestant) in Britain.
85. See Gay News Ltd. v. U.K., 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 (1983) (upholding the prosecution of a
British magazine for publishing a poem found to be blasphemous to Christians because the “main
purpose” of the English common law offense of blasphemous libel is “to protect the rights of citizens
not to be offended in their religious feelings”); Choudhury v. U.K., 12 H.R.L.J. 172 (1991) (declaring
an application contending that English law was prejudicial against Islam inadmissible because there
was no positive obligation on states under the Convention to protect all religious sensibilities);
Wingrove v. U.K., 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1996) (upholding the British government’s refusal to permit
circulation of a film found to be offensive to Christian sensibilities because the government had the
legitimate aim to “protect[] the rights of others”); Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.
R. 56 (ser. A) (1994) (upholding the Austrian government’s seizure of a film on the basis that it
constituted an attack on the Christian religion and Roman Catholicism in particular and concurring
that the government “acted to ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent that some people
should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner.”).
86. See HOUSE OF LORDS, RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES - FIRST REPORT, 2003.
87. Ian Hunter, Religious Offenses and Liberal Politics: From the Religious Settlements to MultiCultural Society (unpublished manuscript at 15, on file with author).
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protection from intolerance on the basis of belief or no belief.88 But not only was
there no apparent way of reconciling this conception of toleration with the liberal
algebra of rights, this approach also appeared to contradict the traditional
conception of England as a “state whose church is part of its constitution” where
“religious belief continues to be a significant component or even determinant of
social values” and thus a state that should “have the role of embodying the
religious identities of its constituent communities.”89 Caught between the three
positions of needing to (1) maintain religious peace, (2) respect universal human
rights, and (3) protect the religious freedom and cultural identity of the nation,
the Committee was paralyzed in a remarkable situation where “the actual
organization of the liberal political and juridical order remain[ed] out of reach of
a central mode of modern moral reflection.”90
The point of this analysis is to suggest that, in contrast to the claims of
classical liberal theory, laws imposing limitations on blasphemy or incitement to
religious hatred may not necessarily be inconsistent with either conceptions of
human rights in international law or the public law of modern liberal democratic
orders. The more interesting question is why blasphemy laws have progressively
lost their basis in sacrilege and assumed instead the form of public order offences
in the secular nomos of modern Europe, and why conversely these laws have
assumed neither of these forms in the United States. If the analysis above is
correct, then the answer lies in the history of competing conceptions of the
public/private divide,91 the role of religion in general and Christianity in
particular in imagining and realizing that divide,92 and how these legal and

88. SELECT COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, REPORT, 2002–3, H.L.
95–I, at 7.
89. Hunter, supra note 87, at 17.
90. Id. at 16.
91. There is an important historical difference between the United States and United Kingdom
on the question of establishment of religion. In the United States, the eighteenth century
Enlightenment notion of non-establishment is entrenched as an express constitutional norm, whereas
in the United Kingdom the Church of England remains established within an older tradition of
common law constitutionalism.
92. Hans Kohn first made the distinction between territorial-civic and ethnocultural nationalism,
the former conceived as a political movement to limit governmental power and secure civic rights
that developed during the Enlightenment, the latter conceived as based on an older conception of the
nation as the product of objective facts pertaining to social life. HANS KOHN, NATIONALISM: ITS
MEANING AND HISTORY 29–30 (1955). The United States and United Kingdom can be viewed again as
competing examples of the relationship between liberalism and nationalism, the former conceived in
an immigrant conception as an “association of citizens” committed to the abstract ideals of liberty,
equality, and republicanism and not based on any single nationality, the latter conceived as a
traditional “nation-state” where a single national or collective identity (shaped in part by a dominant
religion) defines the public sphere. See Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of
Religious Freedom in International Law, supra note 17, at 30–33. Given these different historical
trajectories, it is unsurprising that in the United States while the “logic of blasphemous libel required
courts to find ways of seeing the churches or Christianity in general as indispensible supports of
government . . . . [b]y the middle of the nineteenth century, American courts found themselves
unable to do this, and they struck down prosecutions for blasphemy not on free speech but on antiestablishment grounds. Since Christianity could no longer be seen as part of the organized apparatus
of social control, then vulnerable or not, it would just have to fend for itself in the unruly marketplace
of sacred and profane ideas.” Waldron, supra note 24, at 20.
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political philosophies have generated competing conceptions of pluralism and
toleration in the liberal state.93
C. Conflicts of Rights
While blasphemy laws may be understood in this way as protecting dignity
and public order, they may also be defended in terms of protecting the right to
freedom of religion and belief itself. On this approach, the difficulty we confront
is not a supposed conflict between a right (free speech) and an oppressive
conception of the good (blasphemy), but rather a genuine conflict of fundamental
rights and thus internal to the question of right itself.
The critical point here is that freedom of thought, conscience, and
expression, justified on Enlightenment-rationalist and secular-modernist
grounds, is the dominant value in liberal theory. There are two major difficulties
with this approach. First, as a normative matter, why exactly should free speech
take precedence over respect for religions and the right to freedom of religion
and belief? Nothing in the ICCPR supports the view that Article 19 is
hierarchically superior to Article 18. Conversely, Article 20(2) in fact requires
states to prohibit by law advocacy of religious hatred rising to the level of
incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.94
Second, freedom of religion is compatible with this view only to the extent it
encompasses an inviolable private or inner realm of “belief” or “conscience”—
the so-called forum internum discussed previously—separate from manifestations
of that belief.95 On this view, you may believe in any prophet or religion you
wish, provided you don’t manifest your beliefs in such a way as to restrict the
rights of others to believe (or not to believe) or express (or not to express)
themselves as they choose. The difficulty with this argument is that it relies on a
prior assumption which equates religion with belief or conscience. As Michael
Sandel has argued, this conception connects the case for religious liberty and
state neutrality with a liberal conception of the person whereby the right is
conceived as prior to the good and the self as prior to its ends, i.e. the argument
seeks its justification in the realm of external reasons:
It holds that government should be neutral toward religion in order to respect
persons as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their religious
convictions for themselves. The respect this neutrality commands is not, strictly
speaking, respect for religion, but respect for the self whose religion it is, or

93. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN AMERICAN 27–30 (1992) (noting the
distinction between “New World” and “Old World” pluralism, the former premised on the
nondiscrimination principle in the context of a dominantly immigrant society, the latter premised on
situated cultural and religious majority and minority groups territorially concentrated in historic
territories).
94. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 20(2).
95. The point is not that free exercise of religion is not protected, but that the scope of limitations
on the manifestation of religious beliefs will depend on the theory of religious toleration employed.
Note, for example, the uncertainty following the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v.
Smith regarding the scope of religious toleration in cases involving the enforcement of formally
neutral, general laws that burden the free exercise of religion. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see, e.g., Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993). The critical question is the extent to
which the state recognizes a limited sphere of collective autonomy.
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respect for the dignity that consists in the capacity to choose one’s religion freely.
Religious beliefs are “worthy of respect”, not in virtue of what they are beliefs in,
but rather in virtue of being “the product of free and voluntary choice”, in virtue
of being beliefs of a self unencumbered by convictions antecedent to choice.96

The equation of religion with conscience is the end result of the attempt to
resolve a deep and enduring puzzle in Enlightenment philosophical thought.
How was the state to be neutral between religion and non-religion while at the
same time accord religion special protection? As noted by Andrew Koppelman,
“‘[c]onscience’ promises a way out of this dilemma by describing the basis of free
exercise [of religion] in a way that specifies only the internal psychology of the
person exempted, without endorsing any claims about religious truth.”97 The
power of the argument is that prima facie it avoids appealing to any particular
substantive moral or political values in its premises. But here we meet two
critical objections.
First, why should persons from widely divergent religious and cultural
traditions accept the proposition that only conscience and not religion per se is
the proper object of liberal toleration? Outside of Euro-Atlantic modernity,
where religion and state have entirely different historical configurations, and
where religious identities define differences between majority and minority
groups and entire ways of life, this simply does not work.98 Non-Western
religious traditions such as Islam, for example, do not make the distinction
between the domains of the secular and the sacred or, as in the case of Hinduism,
hierarchically subsume the secular under the sacred.99 Even for Madison and
Jefferson in the eighteenth century it was precisely because religious duties were
to be exercised according to conscience, and because belief was not governed by
the will, that religious liberty was held to be an inalienable right.100 Second, even
if this objection is accepted, why should only religious exercises of conscience be
singled out for special protection?
Similar to the difficulties with Mill’s argument for free speech discussed in
Part II,101 this argument requires us to accept that the right to freedom of religion
should be understood (1) in terms of interiorized conscience, and (2) in terms of

96.

Michael Sandel, Religious Liberty: Freedom of Choice or Freedom of Conscience, in SECULARISM
33, 84 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998).
97. Andrew Koppelman, No Respect: Brian Leiter on Religion (Northwestern Public Law Research
Paper No. 10-07, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544484.
98. As Sandel suggests, this is especially the case for those who “regard themselves as claimed
by religious communities they have not chosen” with the result that “[n]ot all religious beliefs can be
redescribed without loss as ‘the product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful.’” Sandel, supra
note 96, at 85; see also Bhiku Parekh, Superior People: The Narrowness of Liberalism from Mill to Rawls,
TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 25, 1994, at 11–13 (suggesting that classical liberalism linked
“diversity to individuality and choice, and valued the former only in so far as it was grounded in the
individualist conception of man” with the result that it “ruled out several forms of diversity . . . [such
as] traditional and customary ways of life, as well as those centered on community”).
99. T.N. MADAN, MODERN MYTHS, LOCKED MINDS: SECULARISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN INDIA
15 (1997).
100. See ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE
BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010), for a recent discussion of the distinction between “autonomy”
and “conscience.”
101. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
AND ITS CRITICS
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conscience viewed as “freely chosen.”102 The first proposition is utopian in
identifying “conscience” as a universal norm or value that all rational people
should accept and be bound by; the second proposition is apologist for a certain
Protestant conception of religion. Not only is the first proposition in tension with
the second, but each also relies on reasons internal to a particular historicallyand culturally-situated normative tradition. If the right to freedom of religion is
conceived not solely as protecting autonomy in the form of privatized conscience
but as encompassing the ascriptive, communal, public, and ethically sensitive
aspects of religions such as Islam, and if the notion of religious duty is viewed in
this broader conception as a constitutive end essential to the good and personal
identity, then the existing contours and shape of the liberal argument collapse
and the need arises to engage with a genuine conflict of interests internal to the
right itself.
Why, for example, should liberal assumptions not now be reversed as many
representatives of Islamic states have urged and the right peacefully to manifest
one’s religion be regarded as a dominant normative value? On this view,
freedom of thought and opinion remains absolutely protected, but manifestations
of that opinion are now open to limitation to the extent that they incite
discrimination, hostility, or violence toward religious groups. The fraught task of
calibrating the respective rights and interests now resumes, for instance, in
undertaking to draw the line between speech that is “gratuitously offensive” and
speech that, though offensive, contributes to “any form of public debate capable
of furthering progress in human affairs.”103 But while the heremeneutic
difficulties remain, the method and mode of reasoning has shifted. It is now
respect for the intrinsic value and moral importance of religious belief and
practice that provides the unspoken background and tacit starting point for the
ensuing rights discourse.
Different states in different parts of the world, each with their own unique
histories and constitutional settlements, continue to struggle with these questions
and reach different forms of accommodation of the rights claims at issue. The
critical point, however, is that once the concept of religion is viewed in pluralist,
as opposed to one-sided Enlightenment-rationalist or Protestant terms, and once
the collective interests that the right to freedom of religion protects are explicitly
brought back into the analysis, notions such as “discrimination” and “harm” lose
the self-assuredness they assume in liberal rights discourse and become once
again essentially contested concepts within divergent religious and cultural
nomian spheres. Such conceptions of value pluralism and the conflicts that
inevitably arise between fundamental rights have profound implications for any
mapping of individual toleration whether in domestic or international law.104

102. See infra text accompanying note 129 for discussion of Locke’s conception of the free and
unfree conscience.
103. This distinction is drawn by the Court in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria. 295 Eur. Ct. H. R.
49 (ser. A) (1994). Post notes that the distinction between the style and substance of speech is what
underlies British law on blasphemous libel, which permits anything to be said so long as the
“decencies of controversy are observed.” Post, supra note 1, at 80.
104. See infra Part IV.
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D. Offense and Harm
Let us turn to a final objection regarding freedom of religion in this context:
that contrary to the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights in OttoPreminger-Institut v. Austria, persons do not have a right not to be insulted in
their religious beliefs because offense of this kind does not inhibit the right to
practice a religion.105 In response to the Court’s assertion that a “spirit of
tolerance” must be a feature of a democratic society, Post has argued that
“democracy does not require toleration in the sense that persons abandon their
independent evaluation of the beliefs and ideas of others.”106
Recall again the distinction between defamation and offense discussed in
Part II.107 The type of speech at issue in this context is not defamation based on
denigration of some shared ascriptive characteristics of a group (which would be
covered by group libel), but rather speech which provocatively aims to cause
offense, even when “the offense goes to the heart of what . . . [is regarded] as the
identity of their group.”108 Waldron is thus careful to argue that the specific
concern about group libel does not include protection of Islam itself or its
founders:
The group of all Muslims in society, the group of all followers of Islam, is a
group of people committed to the one God, to his Prophet, Mohammed, and to
the holy writings of the Koran. They—the individual Muslims—are entitled to
protection against defamation, including defamation as Muslims. But that doesn’t
mean that the Prophet is to be protected against defamation or the creedal beliefs
of the group. The civic dignity of the members of a group stands separately from
the status of their beliefs, however offensive an attack upon the Prophet or even
upon the Koran may seem.109

As a matter of international law, there is no express provision in human
rights instruments such as the ICCPR or ECHR stating that individuals or groups
have a right to be “free from injury to religious feelings.”110 Rather, these words
have been used in ECHR jurisprudence as the European Court of Human Rights
has stated that, while religious believers cannot expect to be exempt from all
criticism and must tolerate the denial by others of their beliefs, the state does
have a responsibility under Article 9 to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of
believers’ rights. Thus in Wingrove, the actions of the British government were
found to be “intended to suppress behavior likely to cause justified indignation

105. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H. R. 47 (ser. A) (1994) (stating that “in
extreme cases the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as
to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them”).
106. Post, supra note 1, at 79–80 (emphasis added).
107. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
108. Waldron, supra note 24, at 17; RRHA, supra note 35, § 29J (excluding "discussion, criticism or
expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or
practices of their adherents").
109. Waldron, supra note 24, at 17.
110. ICCPR article 19(3) qualifies the right to freedom of expression by providing that the
exercise of this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities . . . [and] may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions . . . provided by law and . . . necessary . . . [f]or respect of the rights or
reputations of others.” ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 19(3).
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amongst believing Christians” and as a consequence “intended to protect the
right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings.”111
The European Court’s notion of injury to religious feelings appears prima
facie to run afoul of the distinction between defamation and offense. It is a sacred
cow of the liberal tradition that causing outrage, moral distress, or offense to
others does not qualify as harm for the purposes of Mill’s Harm Principle—the
principle which holds that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.”112 The reasons in favor of this proposition are wellknown, the leading amongst which are the indispensability of ethical
confrontation to the progress of new and better ideas in society and the
cultivation of a certain open-mindedness in persons.113
On this basis, provocatively assailing certain ideas, traditions, or symbols even
(or especially)114 with the intent of causing offense to a group of persons ought to
be distinguished from defaming or denigrating the group as such—the civic
dignity of the members of a group stands separately from the status of their
beliefs no matter how offensive the attack. The defamation/offense distinction
thus explains the strong reaction in the West against proposals by Islamic states
to prevent the defamation of religion and prophets. As argued by the
philosopher Peter Singer, “[w]hile attempts to stir up hatred against adherents of
a religion, or to incite violence against them, may legitimately be suppressed,
criticism of religion as such should not be.”115
There are two observations to make here. First, it is important to note again
how the belief-action distinction is critical to the logic of this argument. The
forum internum or internal sphere of personal thought, conscience, or belief of
speaker and listener alike is absolutely protected from interference by the law,
i.e. is nonderogable and not subject to limitation by the state. The critique of
ideas, symbols or traditions—each located on the “value” side of the fact/value
distinction—is within the sovereignty of this realm and thus inviolable. While
critique does involve action or manifestation of belief in the form of speech or other
111. Wingrove v. U.K., 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 53 (1996); see also EVANS, supra note 71.
112. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Gateway 1955) (1859).
113. JEREMY WALDRON, Mill and The Value of Moral Distress, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS
1981–1991, at 120–23 (1993).
114. One philosophical argument made in support of the Danish cartoons was that, despite the
offense they caused, “it was even a good thing that pious Muslims felt injured, because being hurt by
criticism might provoke people to re-examine their beliefs–something vital both for democratic
debate and ethical decision-making.” Asad, supra note 4, at 19. In this respect, “criticism of
(questionable) religious beliefs is presented as an obligation of free speech, an act carried out in the
knowledge and power of truth.” Id. (emphasis added).
115. Peter Singer, To Defame Religion is a Human Right, GUARDIAN, Apr. 15, 2009, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/apr/15/religion-islam-atheismdefamation; see also International Religious Liberty Association, Statement of Concern about
Proposals Regarding Defamation of Religions (Sept. 3 2009), http://irla.org/index.php?id=368
(recognizing that when speech constitutes incitement to violence or discrimination it may be limited
according to existing international human rights law, but expressing concern that prohibiting the
“defamation of religions” will not solve the underlying problem of crimes motivated by religious
hatred but will instead increase religious intolerance and infringe the equally fundamental human
rights of freedom of expression and religion, which allow for the critique of religious beliefs and
practices).
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expression and is thus potentially subject to reasonable limitation in the forum
externum, it is not seen to interfere with the forum internum of listeners who, while
potentially offended, insulted, and even threatened by the speech, remain free to
believe in the tenets of their faith or religious tradition.
On this conception, we see familiar liberal assumptions at work again:
speech is understood in terms of autonomy and religion in terms of belief. In the
modern liberal state, religion is thus imagined as having two dimensions: in so
far as it involves actual manifestations of belief and actions in the world, it is
subject to regulation and control by the public (political and legal) spheres; in so
far as it involves matters of conscience, it is imagined as occupying—in a state of
inviolable freedom—the private sphere of personal belief, sentiment, and
identity.116 However this distinction is understood and calibrated in practice, the
law both constructs and reflects the idea of a legal subject possessing an
inviolable inner realm of ideas or beliefs separate from one’s actions and “being
in the world.”
Second, if we change or adjust the conventional understandings of speech
and religion underlying this conception, the implications for Mill’s harm
principle become significantly more complex as the problematic nature of the
notions of harm and moral injury at work are made visible. Mahmood, for
example, asks us to consider what constitutes religion and a proper religious
subjectivity in the modern world? What ethical, communicative, and political
practices may be necessary to make the kind of injury of religious pain caused by
the Danish cartoons not mute but intelligible within the liberal calculus of
rights?117
For Mahmood, the “modern concept of religion—as a set of propositions in
a set of beliefs to which the individual gives assent—owes its emergence to the
rise of Protestant Christianity and its subsequent globalization.”118 The
distinctions between subject and object, and substance and meaning, are
distinguishing features of modernity. Religious symbols and icons are one thing;
sacred figures, with all the devotional respect they might evoke, another. Signs
and symbols are only arbitrarily linked to the abstractions that human beings
have come to revere and regard as sacred.119 Muslims offended by the cartoons
have thus collapsed the necessary distinction between the subject (the divine
status attributed to Muhammad) with the object (pictorial depictions of
Muhammad). Their agitation is a “product of a fundamental confusion about the
materiality of a particular semiotic form that is only arbitrarily, not necessarily,
linked to the abstract character of their religious beliefs.”120 The critical point for
Mahmood is that, to the extent religion is

116. See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 205 (1993) (“the constitution of the modern state required the forcible
redefinition of religion as belief, and of religious belief, sentiment, and identity as personal matters
that belong to the newly emerging space of private (as opposed to public) life”).
117. Mahmood, supra note 3.
118. Id. at 72.
119. Religious signs, such as the cross, are thus not “embodiments of the divine but only stand in
for the divine through an act of human encoding and interpretation.” Id. at 73.
120. Id.
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primarily about belief in a set of propositions to which one lends one’s assent, it
is fundamentally a matter of choice. Once the truth of such a conception of
religion, and concomitant subjectivity, is conceded then it follows that wrongheaded natives and Muslims can perhaps be persuaded to follow a different
reading practice, one in which images, icons and signs do not have any spiritual
consequences in and of themselves but are only ascribed such status through a
set of human conventions . . . . It is this same vision that seems to inform the well
meaning pleas circulating in Europe today for Muslims to stop taking images
such as the Danish cartoons so seriously, to realize that the image (of
Muhammad) can produce no real injury given its true locus is in the interiority of
the individual believer and not the fickle world of material symbols and signs.
The hope that a correct reading practice can yield compliant subjects crucially
depends, in other words, upon a prior agreement about what religion should be
in the modern world.121

The moral injury experienced by Muslims from publication of the Danish
cartoons is intelligible only once one appreciates the relationship of intimacy that
Muslims have with the Prophet. To see this, however, requires adopting an
internal perspective on how Muhammad is regarded as a kind of moral exemplar,
as a “human figure in Islamic doctrine who does not share in divine essence . . .
[and in this respect] is more an object of veneration than worship.”122 Again, as
Mahmood so elegantly explains:
[W]ithin traditions of Muslim piety, a devout Muslim’s relationship to
Muhammad is predicated not so much on a communicative or representational
model but an assimilative one wherein one aims to digest Muhammad’s
personage into oneself as it were. Muhammad, in this understanding, is not
simply a proper noun referring to a particular historical figure, but the mark of a
relation of similitude. In this economy of signification, he is a figure of
immanence in his constant exemplariness, and is therefore not a referential sign
that stands apart from an essence that it denotes.123

There is in this sense a “modality of attachment”—a sense of “embodied
habitation and intimate proximity”—that lies at the heart of the relationship
between devout Muslims and the Islamic Prophet.124 This has a profound effect
on how Islam as a religion is lived and practiced, and how certain embodied
practices and virtues shape the meaning and mode of acquisition of devotion and
piety.125 Once this embodied and affective nature of the relationship between
Muslims and the Prophet is made visible, the notion of moral injury caused by
denigratory or purposively offensive speech no longer falls as neatly into an
imagined forum internum of private belief or conscience. Rather it suggests a

121. Id. at 73–74.
122. Id. at 75–76.
123. Id. at 76.
124. See id.
125. As Mahmood explains, this includes descriptions of the Prophet’s behavior and “his persona
and habits understood as exemplars for the constitution of one’s own ethical and affective equipment
. . . . Such an inhabitation of the model . . . is the result of a labor of love in which one is bound to the
authorial figure through a sense of intimacy and desire. It is not due to the compulsion of ‘the law’
that one emulates the Prophet’s conduct . . . but because of the ethical capacities one has developed.”
Id. at 78.
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sense of violation—and violence—that strikes at a Muslim’s very being, a sense of
wounding against an entire habitus or structure of affect.
It is not immediately obvious how to fit this notion of harm into either of the
concepts discussed in this Article of human dignity and freedom of religion.
Does moral injury of this kind, for example, fall within Waldron’s notion of
dignity in the sense of basic status and social standing? It seems to me such a
case is arguable once being Muslim is understood to encompass the kind of
intimate and affective relationship with Muhammad I have described, and once
the cartoons are viewed not as defaming a religion in the sense of abstract set of
beliefs but rather as defaming or rising to the level of stirring up hatred against a
group of persons as Muslims.
On the other hand, this kind of affective relationship has more of an
intimate and personal, as opposed to strictly public, dimension. To the extent
that dignitarian concerns are related to questions of public order and a wellordered society, perhaps this form of moral injury is of a different kind?
Interestingly, Mahmood suggests that the “sense of moral injury that emanates
from such a relationship between the ethical subject and the figure of
exemplarity is quite distinct from the one that blasphemy encodes.”126 To the
extent then that blasphemy is viewed as a public order offence, the fit within
extant legal categories is not obvious.
In the case of freedom of religion, once this right is interpreted in ECHR
terms as encompassing the collective, public, and sensitive aspects of religious
communities and traditions,127 then we do face a genuine conflict with the right
to free speech. These sorts of conflicts are simply irresolvable in the Kantian and
Rawlsian traditions. As the House of Lords Select Committee discovered in its
2003 review of English blasphemy laws, there is simply no principled way to
resolve conflicts not only between, but also internal, to rights themselves other
than by seeking a form of reconciliation between the particular conceptions of
the good of different groups in the historical context of particular political
communities.128
To do so, however, risks undermining the rationale for rights in the first
place, i.e. the idea that fundamental rights are independent of the good and thus
not subject to the potentially unjust demands of public order. Liberal theory can
resolve such conflicts only by tacitly positing a hierarchy of values or a single
trumping “covering value” (such as autonomy), or by drawing certain “domain
restrictions” between spheres of incommensurable values (e.g. between a public
“secular” and private “religious” sphere) and by then developing theories of
toleration based on open-textured principles such as “reasonableness.” The shift
in these justifications from external to internal reasons is again apparent.

126. Id.
127. See, e.g., I.A. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. no. 42571/98 (2005) (upholding a conviction for the
offense of blasphemy for “an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam” on the basis that “believers may
legitimately feel themselves to be the object of unwarranted and offensive attacks”).
128. See Danchin, supra note 17, at 311–13.
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IV. RELIGIOUS TOLERATION
A. Liberal and Reflexive Toleration
In this final Part, I seek to illustrate the implications of the two dialectical
moves considered in the Article for liberal theories of toleration. Consider John
Locke’s famous exclusion of atheists and Catholics (and, in the same vein,
Muslims) from his theory of religious toleration. For Locke, the right to freedom
of conscience was justified by “the Protestant argument that conscience was
directly bound to obey and follow God and not men; a theory of the free and at
the same time unfree conscience (as the ‘work of God’, as Luther had said).”129
On this basis, there could be no justified claim to the freedom not to believe in
God,130 nor to believe in a faith that was politically subversive and thus not an
authentic religious belief.131 The problem with both atheism and Catholicism was
that the doctrines which flowed from them were suspect because they proceeded
from wholly subjective and flawed premises. In contrast, while Locke’s Magistrate
was Christian, this did not affect his ability objectively to interpret either the
Commonwealth’s civil laws or the universal natural law.
For Locke, Right Reason or Christian theology, or both, provided the
necessary justification for his exclusionary positions. Today, however, we see
distinctly Protestant assumptions at work in each of the arguments above, the
former relying on a particular substantive account of “free conscience,” the latter
advancing a philosophical argument based on external reasons that any rational
person ought to accept simply in virtue of their rationality. In this respect,
Locke’s arguments appear as subjective and vulnerable to precisely the same
sorts of criticisms as those he leveled against Roman Catholicism and atheism.132
While modern liberal theorists such as John Rawls have sought to advance
secular free-standing theories of public reason and autonomous moral
personality independent of comprehensive religious views,133 God remained an
129. Rainer Forst, Toleration and Democracy (unpublished manuscript at 8, on file with author).
130. Forst refers to this as “Locke’s fear,” i.e. the concern that without a particular religious basis
there can be no binding morality and thus no functioning state. Rainer Forst, Pierre Bayle’s Reflexive
Theory of Toleration, in TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS 92 (Jeremy Waldron & Melissa Williams eds.,
2008). Thus, in A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke states: “those are not to be tolerated who deny the
Being of a God. Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have
no hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, tho but even in thought, dissolves all.” JOHN
LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 51 (James Tully ed., Hackett Publishing 1985) (1689).
131. Locke appears to advance three grounds for the exclusion of Catholics: (1) because certain
Roman Catholic doctrines bestow legal privileges on Catholics over and above the civil rights of other
citizens; (2) because such doctrines (as opposed to Catholics themselves or Catholicism as a faith) are
a “secret Evil” posing a threat on account of the secretive nature of Roman Catholic political practice;
and (3) because it is not possible in some cases to disaggregate Catholism as a faith from Catholic
doctrines because they are “absolutely destructive of the society wherein they live” and are premised
on Vaticanism and loyalty to a foreign power. See Peter G. Danchin, The Emergence and Structure of
Religious Freedom in International Law Reconsidered, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 455 (2008).
132. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, The Relevance of Locke’s Religious Arguments for Toleration, 33
POL. THEORY 678, 680 (2005) (noting that Locke’s theory is either incomplete because it relies on
religious premises that many people today reasonably reject or inadequate because it relies on
nonreligious premises regarding belief that fail to provide a valid justification for toleration and
ultimately rest on religious grounds).
133. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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indispensable transcendent premise in Locke’s late-seventeenth-century thinking
about natural rights.134 Like the liberal thinkers that would follow him, Locke
required a non-sectarian but nevertheless deontological argument that could
define rights and indicate their normative significance.135 While necessary, the
combination of the premises of free individuals and a neutral order based on the
consent of those same individuals was on its own insufficient to provide a
coherent justification of individual liberty. Locke thus advanced a theological
conception of natural law not related to any particular religion but ascertainable
through ordinary human reason. While the existence of such a universal natural
law was rationally discoverable, to later theorists Locke’s natural law positions
appear both utopian in the form of Judeo-Christian prejudice and apologist in
justifying restrictions on non-Protestant religious traditions.136
Let us compare Locke’s liberal argument with the reflexive account of
religious toleration advanced by the Huguenot philosopher Pierre Bayle.137 For
Bayle, the primary duty of reason is the mutual justification of any use of religious
or political force, and thus of toleration while at the same time having good
reasons to regard one’s own faith or beliefs as true. The critical point here was
that human reason must recognize its own boundaries and finitude and accept
the unavoidability of pluralism and reasonable disagreement. On this view, the
respect owed to others is not on account of a particular ethical conception of the
good (e.g. that personal autonomy is a precondition for the good life) but rather
on “a moral notion of the person as a reasonable being with . . . a right to
justification.”138 This right is “based on the recursive general principle that every
norm that is to legitimize the use of force (or, more broadly speaking, a morally
relevant interference with other’s actions) claims to be reciprocally and generally
valid and therefore needs to be justifiable by reciprocally and generally nonrejectable reasons.”139 Bayle’s critical insight into the finitude of reason as
evidenced by Locke’s unreflexive and one-sided theory of toleration is another
illustration of the shift from external to internal reasons. This shift in perspective
opens the way for the normative ground for this view: the demanding moralpolitical virtue to respect the autonomy of others as reason-giving and reasonreceiving subjects.

134. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN
LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002).
135. Waldron has argued that for Locke it was an open question the extent to which nonChristian or non-monotheistic faiths may provide a basis (through some form of Rawlsian
overlapping consensus) for a theory of natural rights and human equality. Certainly, while Locke’s
main concern was with theism per se (i.e. belief in God), his work drew virtually exclusively on JudeoChristian sources. Id.
136. This is not to say that Locke did not turn his “universalist critique against European customs,
and conjectures” as well. The point is not that “Locke reflexively invest[ed] the practices of his own
culture with an aura of moral universalism” or that he was “complicit in a deliberate attempt to
dehumanize the peoples and practices that the colonists faced in the new world.” Id. at 168. Rather,
the point is that Locke’s natural law and the doctrines he derived from it no longer appear to us three
centuries later as either especially natural, objective, or universal.
137. See Forst, supra note 130, at 78.
138. Forst, supra note 129, at 14.
139. Id.

Danchin_final_1.doc (Do Not Delete)

5/19/2010 1:27:31 PM

DEFAMING MUHAMMAD

35

B. Two Faces of Religious Toleration
Locke’s and Bayle’s theories represent two rival philosophies and histories
of liberal toleration—the former a universal moral ideal seeking rational
consensus on principles of right and justice that stand apart from conflicts over
the good, the latter an ethical modus vivendi seeking peaceful coexistence between
rival ways of life as opposed to a comprehensive moral theory governing all
ways of life.140 As a political ideal, reflexive toleration is thus a contingent good
limited by the form of ethical reasoning which gives it its force by drawing upon
the conflicting values and internal reasons for action of the individuals and
groups that it seeks to bind.
In interpreting what the right to religious liberty means today in religiously
and culturally diverse societies, it is helpful to distinguish between the
“permission” and “respect” models of toleration. The permission model is a
relation between an authority (or in a democracy, a majority) and a dissenting,
different minority or various minorities. On this view, toleration means that “the
authority (or majority) gives qualified permission to the members of the minority
to live according to their beliefs on the condition that the minority accepts the
dominant position of the authority (or majority).”141 By contrast, the respect
model is a moral view which regards all individuals, whether members of
majority or minority ethical groups, none of which is favored, as having equal
legal and political status as guaranteed by a common framework of rights and
liberties.142
Each model can in fact adopt either of the rival philosophies of toleration.
The permission model of toleration (as has shaped most European nation-states)
may evolve reflexively towards a co-existence conception that seeks, not a
vertical relationship where a majority stands over minorities in a position of legal
authority but, a horizontal relationship with groups standing in a relationship of
coexistence relative to each other, at the same time subjects and objects of
toleration. A respect model of toleration, however, may reflexively adopt a
principle of substantive equality that acknowledges that formal equality is
intolerant towards those religious communities whose beliefs and practices
require a degree of public presence and collective identity that is both different

140. See JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM (2000).
141. As Forst notes, as long as “the expression of their difference is limited . . . and as long as the
groups do not claim equal public and political status, they can be tolerated on both pragmatic and
principled grounds. Rainer Forst, Toleration, Justice and Reason, in THE CULTURE OF TOLERATION IN
DIVERSE SOCIETIES: REASONABLE TOLERANCE 73 (Catriona McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds., 2003)
(emphasis added). The origins of the permission conception can be traced to the 1598 Edict of Nantes
in late sixteenth century France and to the later Toleration Act of 1689 in England. Both of these
regimes of toleration involved complex matrices of freedom and domination and of inclusion and
exclusion as the majority granted to minorities the liberty, but not the equal right, to practice their
religion and participate in public life. See Rainer Forst, To Tolerate Means to Insult, in RECOGNITION
AND POWER 215, 215–16 (Bert Van Den Brink & David Owens eds., 2007).
142. The history of the respect conception is traced by Forst to the struggle of Protestant provinces
in the north of the Netherlands against Spanish rule and the enforcement of Catholicism in the
sixteenth century, and to the later English Civil War and Protestant arguments for conscience being
bound to obey and follow God and not men. See Forst, To Tolerate Means to Insult, supra note 141, at
223.
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from the majority cultural form and unable to accommodate the public/private
distinction.143
A respect model of toleration may conversely adopt a formal notion of
liberal equality in which, although all citizens have equal rights, cultural and
religious differences are confined to the “private” sphere on the basis of a
public/private distinction. This model is reflected in the laicité of French
republicanism and in the Rawlsian priority of the right (equal basic liberties)
over the good. In contrast, a permission model may continue to exist within the
framework of a modern liberal democracy. As in the case of speech inciting
religious hatred in the United Kingdom, a majority may continue to rely on a
permission conception notwithstanding the need to justify it under a scheme of
basic equal liberties of all citizens.
What is decisive then is not the model of toleration that exists in a state, but
rather the philosophy and mode of reasoning that underpins and justifies its
normative application and development. The argument advanced in this Article
suggests that Bayle’s reflexive philosophy as applied to the respect model of
toleration is superior to the alternatives. The difficulty, however, is how to apply
this conception in practice. Is it the claims of the editors of Jyllands-Posten or
those of offended Muslims, for example, that are more reciprocally or generally
valid? The criteria of reciprocity and generality arguably function in much the
same way, and face the same disabling indeterminacies, as the concepts of
neutrality and general applicability in liberal theory. The outcome in practice
therefore is likely to be a gradual shift towards the permission model, albeit in its
liberal democratic form. Nevertheless, as Forst concludes, reflexive toleration is
the
attitude of those who are willing to engage in such arguments, who accept the
criteria of reciprocity and generality, and who accept in a given case that their
arguments do not suffice to be the basis of general law. Still, given . . . justified
doubts, it is important to add another reason for toleration connected to this: the
toleration of those who see that a debate remains in a standstill and that therefore
no side can show its claims and reasons to be superior. In such a case, toleration
means to accept that other grounds for the regulation of a conflict have to be
found, by way of compromise.144

C. Democratic Theory and Political Legitimacy
There is one final objection levied against the enactment of hate speech or
group libel laws that needs to be addressed. Robert Post145 and Ronald
Dworkin146 have argued that, beyond the link between free expression and the
flourishing of democratic self-government, free speech is the price we pay for
political legitimacy. “‘The majority has no right to impose its will on someone who
143. See, e.g., ANNA ELISABETTA GALEOTTI, TOLERATION AS RECOGNITION 126 (2002) (suggesting
that the idea of liberal neutrality should not be abandoned but rather reinterpreted so that public
recognition of minoritarian differences is itself regarded as form of neutrality and impartiality).
144. Forst, To Tolerate Means to Insult, supra note 141, at n.32.
145. See Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267
(1991).
146. See Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY v–ix (Ivan Hare &
James Weinstein eds., 2009).
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is forbidden to raise a voice in protest . . . before the decision is taken.’ If we want
legitimate laws against violence or discrimination, we must let their opponents
speak. And then we can legitimize those laws by voting.”147 On this basis, no
matter how extreme or vicious the speech of opponents of anti-discrimination
laws may be, that speech must be allowed in order to legitimate other laws that
prohibit violence or discrimination.
Accepting the fact that hate speech laws do impose restrictions on speech on
account of its content,148 there clearly are differences of degree in the ways such
speech may insult, humiliate, or intimidate groups of people. Most hate speech
laws are carefully crafted to allow the propositional content of views to be
expressed in such a way that they become subject to suppression only when
expressed in vicious or vituperative terms intended to stir up hatred through
attacking the basic social standing and elementary dignity of vulnerable
groups.149 While these are always difficult, and at times elusive, lines to draw
and involve the balancing of divergent values and making of contested value
judgments, both Post’s and Dworkin’s objections on the grounds of democratic
theory and political legitimacy are answerable. As we have seen, the vast
majority of advanced democracies have enacted such laws without visibly
diminishing the legitimacy of their various anti-discrimination laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Serious consideration of how the American legal system should engage
with Islamic norms and the claims of Muslim communities has only just begun.
The public sphere of a liberal democracy such as the United States cannot
accommodate all Islamic claims and sensibilities. The specific question addressed
in this Article has been whether Muslim communities should be guaranteed
protection from incitement to religious hatred as a matter of human dignity, or
freedom of religion, or both. The scope and terms of engagement and the mode
of deliberation under which the encounter between liberal theory and Islamic
norms occurs will be determinative of how this question is ultimately addressed.
We have seen that liberal rights and the K each guarantee freedom of
religion and freedom of thought. But they do so in different ways and for
different reasons. The Lockean notion of religious belief as the simultaneously
free and unfree will is quite distinct from the Islamic notion of religious belonging
understood as a particular way of life where the individual does not own herself.
Blasphemy, in this sense, is less concerned with belief or disbelief as with
violently disrupting a living relationship. Viewing the Danish cartoon
controversy solely through the lens of liberal theory masks the contingency and
particularity of the normative assumptions upon which this theory rests and
avoids an engagement with the internal point of view of a distinct normative
147. Waldron, supra note 49, at 4 (restating Dworkin’s account of political legitimacy).
148. Waldron notes that other countries do not subscribe to the doctrine that an exception to free
speech may not be based on the content of what is said or published and describes First Amendment
jurisprudence as having “gone down a blind alley” in this area and being an example of “pathdependency.” Id. at 19. Hate speech and group libel laws thus directly confront two of the main
justifications for the content-based restriction doctrine, i.e. the market place of ideas and suspicion of
majoritarian government rationales. Id. at 2–3.
149. Id. at 9–10.
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system with its own hierarchies, disputes over interpretation, and standards of
rational justification. On this approach, there is no dialogue, no search for
possible forms of coexistence, reconciliation or overlapping consensus; there is
only a dialogue of the deaf and a one-sided assertion of right.
By contrast, we need to consider what it may mean for a Muslim
community to practice and maintain its religion in the conditions of
contemporary European or North American society. What obstacles might such
communities face? The degree to which rights to dignity and religious freedom
may enable the practice of Islam as a religion and way of life free from visible
manifestations of hate and incitement to religious hatred are essentiallycontested but increasingly important questions. If all we see in the normative
claims of Muslims are threats to freedom, however, the debate will remain at its
current impasse.

